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I. "I HOPE You ARE TEACHING QUALITY
TO YOUR STUDENTS"'
That statement-whether idly or intentionally put-
marked the beginning of the strange and wonderful quest
chronicled in Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance. The speaker was not a Zen master nor was Pir-
sig a Zen disciple. Yet the statement led Pirsig on a Zen-like
quest for a definition of quality.2 The answer gave him, as it
can give the lawyer, a Zen-like insight and understanding.3
Pirsig, a rhetoric teacher, began his quest with his stu-
dents. He asked for an essay on "what is quality in thought
and statement," an assignment that made them furious, fear-
ful, and frustrated.4  Eventually, he gave the students a
definition:
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1. ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 160
(Bantam New Age Books 1974).
2. The statement became a Zen-like "koan . . . a question from the Unknown."
JANWILLEM VAN DE WETERING, A GLIMPSE OF NOTHINGNESS 15 (1975). See also
Williamson B. C. Chang, Zen, Law, and Language: Of Power and Paradigms, 16 N.M.
L. REV. 543 (1986), describing a Koan "as the primary methodological vehicle for
achieving enlightenment." It "is a heuristic device designed to attack the structure of
normal conceptual thinking." Id.
3. See JANwILLEM VAN DE WETERING, THE EMPTY MIRROR 127 (1973). See also
Chang, supra note 2, at 544, noting that the goal of Zen practice "is satori or
enlightenment," which "is characterized by a complete shift in the student's perception
of the world." A lawyer's education and practice can also be characterized as a quest
for understanding and enlightenment. See James R. Elkins, The Quest for Meaning:
Narrative Accounts of Legal Education, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 577 (1988).
4. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 163-64, 183-84. See Kenney Hegland, Goodbye to
Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1209 n.19 (1985), describing this "marvelous
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Quality is a characteristic of thought and statement that is
recognized by a nonthinking process. Because definitions
are a product of rigid, formal thinking, Quality cannot be
defined.5
Then below this he wrote: "But even though Quality cannot
be defined, you know what Quality is! "6
Using their own work, Pirsig convinced his students that
quality, although undefinable, existed. He demonstrated that
rhetorical rules, like legal rules, were tools "for producing
what really counted and stood independently of the tech-
niques--Quality."7 Quality work is mysterious and individual;
it is the goal of those who care about their work. To work
without a concern for quality would be to work without value,
without purpose.' Pirsig gave his students confidence that they
had the ability to do quality work.9
Rhetoric, like law, is an art, an art of persuasion.' 0 And,
scene" and its conclusion when Pirsig persuaded his students they could recognize
quality work:
Perhaps the same thing occurs when we recognize a lousy legal argument:
first we sense it, and only then can we define it. If we do in fact share these
intuitions, then perhaps subjectivity is not the irrational, arbitrary,
individualistic beast it is made out to be.
5. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 184-85.
6. Id. at 185.
7. Id. at 186. See Jerry Frug, Argument As Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869, 872
(1988), suggesting that
[W]e look at legal argument as an example of rhetoric. A rhetorical analysis
of legal argument involves examining its elements.., in terms of how they
form attitudes or induce actions in others. . . . It doesn't matter, from a
rhetorical point of view, that each of these elements of legal argument is
contestable; what matters is how these elements are combined to constitute an
appeal to an audience-how they present a view of the world which others are
asked to share.
See also Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV.
1545, 1547-48 (1990): "Rhetoric has long had strong connections with advocacy and the
study of law.... Rhetoric offers us a set of tools for thinking about the discursive con-
ventions within which we work. Just as important, it also offers us a series of specific
insights."
8. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 187, 194. Lawyers should seek for value, for purpose in
what they do. See Sally Payton, Is Thinking Like a Lawyer Enough?, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 233, 246 (1985).
9. PIRsIG, supra note 1, at 185-87. See also Richard B. Parker, A Review of Zen
and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance with Some Remarks on the Teaching of Law,
29 RUTGERS L. REV. 318, 326 (1976): "[Wlhatever it is we teach, we do it by building
the student's confidence in his ability to perform."
10. See James B. White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural
and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684-85 (1985):
The ancient rhetorician Gorgias ... defined rhetoric as the art of persuading
the people about matters of justice and injustice in the public places of the
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like Pirsig's rhetoric students, we lawyers-students, teachers,
practitioners-have the ability to do quality work. However,
like Pirsig's students, we become furious, fearful, or frustrated
when challenged to do so." We are puzzled when challenged
to pursue something as elusive as quality. 12 How often in our
education or practice are we asked to describe, much less pur-
sue, the ideal?13 But should not our quest, like Pirsig's, be for
quality?
II. THE CHAUTAUQUA
To describe his quest, Pirsig used a Chautauqua, a popular
talk intended to entertain while enlightening the audience. 4
His talk explored channels "silted in with the debris of
thoughts grown stale and platitudes too often repeated."' 5 It
cut "deeply rather than broadly," and its answers moved "the
silt downstream."' 6 Pirsig, like many lawyers, began with a
structure of concepts, a framework for approaching a defini-
state, and one could hardly imagine a more compendious statement of the art
of the lawyer than that.... And the commitment of the rhetorician to the
cause of his client presents him ... with serious (and similar) problems of
intellectual and personal integrity.
11. See Wetlaufer, supra note 7, at 1583:
Our students have an interesting and complicated relationship to the
Kingsfieldian tradition. They may well resent the victimization that is
characteristic of the hard Socratic method, but they respect the authority
which makes it work. Indeed, within a range of circumstances and victims,
the assault is approved, even revered.... Where the students differ from their
Kingsfieldian teachers is in their demand for a particular kind of authoritative
speaking-for clarity, closure, certainty, and the one true meaning of the text.
Even in criticizing certain aspects of our Kingsfieldian rhetoric, they invoke
the norms of authority, hierarchy, clarity, the one right answer, and closure.
12. See James B. White, Doctrine in a Vacuum." Reflections on What a Law
School Ought (And Ought Not) to Be, 18 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 251, 253-54 (1985).
13. See Robert S. Redmount, Law Learning, Teacher-Student Relations, and the
Legal Process, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 853, 860-61 (1981):
The professional person is an idealized figure in Western society and thought
to be something more than a skillful methodologist. The desirable lawyer...
might be seen as knowledgeable, virtuous, and learned in dialectical inquiry.
He is a guardian for society and a leader of humankind. He is concerned with
practical action and skilled in the use of language as a prime mover of social
interest. He is, withal, tolerant and magnanimous, and he shows a breadth of
perspective. Though disciplined and educated, he is also a vital and feeling
person. He is open minded, reflective, and inquiring, with strong moral
purpose. He values meaningful and considerate relationships with others.
14. See PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 7.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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tion of quality.'7 His concepts, like the lawyer's, formed a sys-
tem, for he knew, as the lawyer does, that the mind cannot
instantly comprehend the whole; it needs a system to help it
manage the components of the whole.'" The system enabled
Pirsig, as it does the lawyer, to go past perception to concep-
tion, to increase the range of his thoughts. 9
Pirsig used motorcycle maintenance as the overall struc-
ture for his Chautauqua. Pirsig distinguished the physical
labor of maintenance ("the smallest and easiest part of what
the mechanic does")20 from the need for "careful observation
and precise thinking," its greater and more important part:2'
By asking the right questions and choosing the right tests
and drawing the right conclusions the mechanic works his
way down the echelons of the motorcycle hierarchy until he
has found the exact specific cause or causes of the engine
failure, and then he changes them so that they no longer
cause the failure.22
Asking the right questions, choosing the right tests, drawing
the right conclusions: this process is as much the lawyer's
work as the mechanic's.23 The questions we ask in defining a
problem shape the legal theories we explore to resolve it; those
theories necessarily shape the solutions we devise.
What happens when the mechanic or lawyer gets stuck,
when questions do not come or tests are not apparent or con-
clusions do not follow? 24 For Pirsig, "[i]f your mind is truly,
profoundly stuck, then you may be much better off than when
it is loaded with ideas. ' 25 You reevaluate and expand what you
17. Id. at 87. This process should be familiar to any problem solver, including the
lawyer. When confronted with a problem, all able lawyers develop a framework for
acquiring, analyzing, and arranging information. See Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical
Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn from
Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284, 289
(1981).
18. See PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 87. See also Robert Keeton, Teaching and Testing
for Competence in Law Schools, 40 MD. L. REV. 203, 205-06 (1981).
19. See Alan D. Hornstein, The Myth of Legal Reasoning, 40 MD. L. REV. 338, 342
(1981).
20. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 96.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See James R. Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask,
64 VA. L. REV. 735, 744 (1978).
24. And who has not had this happen? See James B. White, The Study of Law as
an Intellectual Activity, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 8-9 (1982).
25. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 256. See also David Blum, Profiles: A Process Larger
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do know; you concentrate on why you are stuck and see it in a
new way; you not only survive being stuck but grow from it.
Being stuck is an opportunity to focus, to identify and avoid
traps, to move on.26
One of Pirsig's more extended Chautauquas on motorcycle
maintenance dealt with gumption, a homely word that
"describes exactly what happens to someone who connects
with Quality. He gets filled with gumption," filled with enthu-
siasm for the task.27 Gumption is "psychic gasoline," a mental
relationship between machine and mechanic, the problem and
the person; it is "a reservoir of good spirits that can be added to
or subtracted from.
28
Anything causing a loss of enthusiasm or good spirits is a
gumption trap; it is either external ("in which you're thrown
off the Quality track by conditions that arise from external cir-
cumstances" such as unavailable parts) or internal (in which
"you're thrown off . . .by conditions primarily within your-
self").' The lawyer is more likely to be trapped by the inter-
nal gumption trap, which Pirsig subdivided into value traps
("those that block affective understanding"), truth traps
("those that block cognitive understanding"), and muscle traps
("those that block psychomotor behavior").30
For Pirsig, as for the lawyer, the most dangerous trap is
the value trap, the blind spot. It results in the inability,
whether from inheritance or instruction, to view the problem
Than OneseVf, THE NEW YoRxER, May 1, 1989, at 48, where the cellist Yo-Yo Ma
describes his approach to technique problems:
When a problem is complex, you become tense, but when you break it down
into basic components you can approach each element without stress. Then,
when you put it all together, you do something that seems externally
complex, but you don't feel it that way. You know it from several different
angles.
26. PISIG, supra note 1, at 249-58. See also VAN DEWETERING, A GLIMPSE OF
NOTHINGNESS, supra note 2, at 165, describing the Zen method of teaching.
No shortcuts and no simplicity. Only one part of the teaching is simple. The
disciple has to meditate.... Meditation is the Zen master's recipe, the base of
his teaching. And for the rest he forces you to do the impossible and makes
you jump through walls or off the precipice. Let go! Let go! Don't hold on to
anything. And don't disregard your doubts. Let your doubts move you on.
Don't think that you have found something because it's about time that you
have found something. Go on, do the best you can. And know that there is no
guarantee whatever that you will ever make it.
27. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 272.
28. Id. at 274.
29. Id. at 275.
30. Id. at 279.
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cleanly, openly.3 ' There are five components: value rigidity,
ego, anxiety, boredom, impatience. The first, value rigidity, is
"an inability to revalue what one sees because of commitment
to previous values. ' 32  If you are value rigid, you cannot ask
fresh questions, acquire new facts, adopt new theories. You
will not, as the good mechanic or lawyer must, continue to dis-
cover as you go. Value rigidity
often shows up in premature diagnosis, when you're sure
you know what the trouble is, and then when it isn't, you're
stuck. Then you've got to find some new clues, but before
you can find them you've got to clear your head of old opin-
ions. If you're plagued with value rigidity you can fail to see
the real answer even when it's staring you right in the face
because you can't see the new answer's importance.
3 3
The mechanic or the lawyer caught in this trap must slow
down, go back, reexamine, reevaluate.
The second component of the value trap is ego. The dan-
gers to the mechanic or lawyer are apparent:
If you have a high evaluation of yourself then your ability to
recognize new facts is weakened. Your ego isolates you from
the Quality reality. When the facts show that you've just
31. Id. See Payton, supra note 8, at 238:
[Flormal legal education, in addition to being by no means an education in
lawyering, affirmatively inculcates in law students a characteristic pattern of
blind spots that a good lawyer must overcome if he or she is to represent
clients competently, assuming that the goal is to serve clients and not to
exploit them....
See also Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and The Rule of Law: New
Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2099, 2126 (1989):
[Tihe call to context, at its best, simply counsels against complacency. We are
admonished to revisit our experience and feelings, along with other guides to
reasoned judgments, and to guard against empathic or intellectual blind spots
when we construct and critique the legal institutions and standards that gov-
ern us. Foolish formalism, they caution, is to be feared. But so too, I would
demur, is unguided emotion.
32. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 279-80. This trap is present in any creative work. See
K. Robert Schwarz, How to Succeed at Success, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,1988, at H23, quoting
Itzhak Perlman:
If I start saying "I'm at the top," then I might as well quit, because where can
I go from there? What I think about is that I have a responsibility to keep on
growing musically, and not fall into the trap of saying, "Well, this works, and
I might as well just keep making a Xerox of myself".... The trap that one
can fall into is the lack of asking questions, when you put yourself on
automatic and you start to play like you've played before. That's one of the
dangers, and it is a result of not listening well to oneself, of not asking, "is it
sounding the way I want it to sound?"
33. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 280.
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goofed, you're not as likely to admit it. When false informa-
tion makes you look good, you're likely to believe it.34
The way out is to cultivate a problem-solving approach which
"genuinely feels and reasons and acts, rather than any false,
blown up personality images your ego may conjure up. '
The third component of the value trap is anxiety. Here, in
contrast to ego, the mechanic or lawyer becomes afraid to do
anything because he or she assumes it will turn out wrong. It
leads to "errors of excessive fussiness."'  Pirsig had a two step
remedy. First, work out the anxiety through preparation: read,
list, organize, reorganize. Second, remember that everyone
makes mistakes in working through problems. The benefit for
the mechanic and the lawyer is the knowledge gained. Making
mistakes is not bad; making mistakes and not learning from
them is.
The fourth component of the value trap is boredom, the
opposite of anxiety. The bored mechanic or lawyer is not see-
ing things freshly.37 The task has been done before. How
many times have you changed the oil, washed the machine;
how many times have you argued the motion, written the
memo? The remedy? Stop. Do something else: walk, run,
read, sleep.
The final component is impatience, a result of underesti-
mating how long a job will take. Pirsig handled impatience by
being flexible. If he did not have an indefinite or an adequate
amount of time for the job planned, he limited the scope of
what he wanted to do. If necessary, he scaled down his overall
goal and scaled up his immediate goal.' All lawyers will rec-
ognize this component. Law school does prepare for practice
here. Lawyers are list makers; we want to see who wants what
when. We divide and subdivide our assignments into managea-
ble parts. When the unexpected arises, we pause, redo the list,
and get on with the most immediate task.
There is a transcendent goal in working through these
value traps, these blind spots. In working on a mechanical or a
legal problem, the individual also works on him or herself.
The machine and the mechanic, the problem and the lawyer,
34. Id. at 283.
35. Id. at 284.
36. Id.
37. I at 285.
38. Id. at 286.
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are not divisible. Many opportunities encourage them to move
toward quality together s9
III. THE QUESTION
When he began the inquiry into quality, Pirsig's col-
leagues, whether in bemusement or bitterness, presented him
with a reasonable question: "'Does this undefined 'quality' of
yours exist in the things we observe?' they asked. 'Or is it sub-
jective, existing only in the observer?' "o Pirsig recognized
this as a tough question. If quality exists in observable things
then why is it undetectable by instrument, unmeasurable by
science? But if it is personal to the observer, then is it not just
"a fancy name for whatever you like?"4 1
Pirsig had a dilemma which lawyers share. Lawyers, like
Pirsig's colleagues, tend to view things exclusively as either/or:
either quality was objective or subjective; either rational and
demonstrable or intuitive and sensed.'
What you've got here, really, are two realities, one of imme-
diate artistic appearance and one of underlying scientific
explanation, and they don't match and they don't fit and
they don't really have much of anything to do with one
another. That's quite a situation. You might say there's a
little problem here.
43
Some people look at a motorcycle and see a shape, others see
39. See id. at 293. See also Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral
Discourse, 55 NoTRE DAME LAW. 231 (1979).
40. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 205. We in the law are likewise faced with that
question. See John E. Dunsford, Nihilism and Legal Education - A Response to
Sanford Levinson, 31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 27, 31-33 (1986). Like Pirsig's colleagues, some
lawyers assume that this question exhausts the "two categorical possibilities for the
workings of language and rationality." Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense,
Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1129
(1989).
41. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 205. This is also a tough question in the law. See
Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195,
1197-98 (1989):
[I]f (as the rationalist maintains) the only significant order in law rests in its
formal expression, the realist attacks on traditional doctrinalist jurisprudence
are tantamount to a rejection of order-pure and simple. Similarly, if it is
only the articulation of doctrine and rules that can constrain legal decisions
(as the rationalist maintains), the realist claims that doctrinal argument is
undecidable must be an endorsement of the untenable view that anything
goes. And more globally, if rationalism is the only sensible approach to law,
then the realist rejection of rationalism is indeed a plunge into nihilism.
42. See Parker, supra note 9, at 320.
43. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 49.
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ideas; a cook reads recipes, a chef sees possibilities. The former
sees parts; the latter sees concepts.44 Pirsig labeled this dichot-
omy "the classic-romantic barrier," a barrier that is equally
present in the law; classical law is rational, systemic, fixed;
romantic law is intuitive, situational, fluid.45
The Classic person-mechanic or lawyer-"sees the world
as underlying form itself."'  Given a blueprint, the Classic
becomes "fascinated by it because he sees that within the lines
and shapes and symbols is a tremendous richness of underlying
form. ' 47 The Classic "is straightforward, unadorned, unemo-
tional, economical and carefully proportioned." 48 The Classic
orders chaos, is restrained and controlled.
The Romantic person-mechanic or lawyer-sees the
world "primarily in terms of immediate appearance," with
feelings rather than as fact.49 The Romantic is "inspirational,
imaginative, creative, intuitive."'  Rather than proceeding by
rule or reason, the Romantic relies on feeling and intuition.
The Classic and Romantic do not have much of anything
to do with each other. The Classic views the Romantic as
[f]rivolous, irrational, erratic, untrustworthy, interested pri-
marily in pleasure seeking. Shallow. Of no substance.
Often a parasite who cannot or will not carry his own
weight. A real drag on society.51
The Romantic sees the Classic as
44. See George Steiner, Uneasy Rider, THE NEW YORKER, April 15, 1974, at 147-48
(reviewing ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAInrENANCE
(1974)):
Pirsig's work is, like so much of classic American literature, Manichaean. It is
formed of dualities, binary oppositions, presences, values, codes of utterance in
conflict. Father against son; the architectures of the mind against those of the
machine; a modernity of speed, uniformity, and consumption (of fuel, of space,
of political gimmicks) against conservancy, against the patience of true
thought. But these confrontations are themselves ambiguous; they keep us off
balance and straining for poise as do the swerves of the motorcycle.
45. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 84. See Edgar Bodenheimer, Classicism and
Romanticism in the Law, 15 UCLA L. REV. 915, 915 (1968), showing that "classical and
romantic views of life have a definite bearing not only on the understanding and
analysis of legal thought but also on some practical aspects of the administration of
justice." The author concluded that the law's traditional classical rationality needed to
be balanced by realizing that the interests of justice often demand romantic fluidity.





51. Id. at 62.
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dull, awkward and ugly .... Everything is in terms of pieces
and parts and components and relationships. Nothing is fig-
ured out until it's run through the computer a dozen times.
Everything's got to be measured and proved. Oppressive.
Heavy. Endlessly grey. The death force.
52
Pirsig's classic-romantic barrier exists in the law, inside
and outside law school. Inside, teachers and students wrestle
with the persistent tension between intellectual determinacy
and real life indeterminacy.5' Outside, practitioners don a pro-
fessional mask to hide a human face. 4 Inside, we engage in
the techniques of traditional legal reasoning without acknowl-
edging the world outside where legal reasoning will operate.'
Inside, we deal with law as if it were determinate, objective,
and structured, knowing that outside it is indeterminate, sub-
jective, and chaotic.5' Inside, we intellectualize the law, cut out
its emotional content; outside, we know that feeling, intuition,
creativity, and spontaneity are so important.5 7 Inside, legal
problems are dealt with in the abstract; outside, they are dealt
with in the flesh.
If lawyers are to find quality in the law, we must, like Pir-
sig, come to grips with the split. We are Classic and Romantic.
We want coherence and consistency, but we must understand
there is always chaos and complexity. 5
52. Id. at 61-62.
53. See Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54
VA. L. REV. 637 (1968). See also Joseph P. Tomain, Faith, Hope, and the Law Teacher:
A Reaction to Professor Levinson, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 101, 103 (1986).
54. See Elkins, The Legal Persona, supra note 23.
55. See Payton, supra note 8, at 235, arguing that law schools do not emphasize
enough that the law is a craft, a blend of reasoning and action, a confluence of
detached intellect and direct involvement in individual problem-solving.
56. See White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 10, at 685:
mhe law is at present usually spoken of... as if it were a body of more or
less determinate rules, or rules and principles, that are more or less perfectly
intelligible to the trained reader. Law is in this sense objectified and made a
structure. The question "What is law?" is answered by defining what its rules
are, or by analyzing the kinds of rules that characterize it. The law is thus
abstracted and conceptualized.
Professor White believes (as I do) that if this were true, "both law school and the prac-
tice of law would be intolerably boring." White, The Study of Law, supra note 24, at 2.
57. See Marc Feldman & Jay M. Feinman, Legal Education Its Cause and Cure,
82 MICH. L. REV. 914, 926 (1984).
58. See Christine B. Whitman, Thoughts on Teaching, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 267,
271 (1985), and Massaro, supra note 31, at 2120:
We are presented with the ancient and perpetual task of balancing two
important yet conflicting desires, both of which are essential to our sense of
"justice" or "fairness." We have always desired rule predictability/clarity/
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Our training must acknowledge that the study of law can
dull sensibility rather than enlarge it; the goal should be the
education, not the eradication, of feeling." Our practice must
recognize that the law is mutable yet responsible.' The Clas-
sic lawyer must recognize that the law is not an abstract intel-
lectual exercise but a craft with immediate real world
implications; the Romantic lawyer must recognize that the law
is not merely situational but must be structured and stable.6 '
Law is not the application of pure reason, nor is it whatever we
like. It is the interaction of the rational and emotional, the
classic and the romantic. It is a complex, often mysterious pro-
cess, unique to the individual. That is its joy and its challenge.
Pirsig's own classic/romantic split created difficulties in
finding an answer to his colleagues' question about the nature
of quality: is it objective or subjective? To begin, he sorted his
world into piles. His classic side was concerned with the
framework for sorting and relating the piles.62 His romantic
side was concerned with the world before the sorting began.6 3
Pirsig wanted to find a way of looking at his world that would
accommodate these two kinds of understanding and, with luck,
consistency yet also valued rule flexibility/responsiveness .... The tension
between our competing, even contradictory, desires for clarity and fluidity
never will disappear.
59. Terrence Sandalow, The Moral Responsibility of Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 163, 172 (1984). See also Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The
World of Law and Lawyering as Portrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the
Law School Curriculum, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1157 (1990).
60. White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 10, at 690. See also Winter, supra note 40,
at 1112 n. 21:
No counselor worth her salt would fail to advise a client of the grey areas.
And no advocate who cares to win would be content merely with generating
"plausible" arguments. In each case, the challenge of the lawyer's craft is to
devise ex ante (i.e. with predictability) a position that will prevail ex post.
This requires a sense of both the pliability of legal materials available to a
judge and the kinds of constraints that she will find persuasive. To be
successful either as a counselor or as advocate, one must simultaneously
understand both the partial predictability and relative indeterminacy of law.
61. Parker, supra note 9, at 323. See also William J. Brennan Jr., Reason, Passion,
and "The Progress of the Law," 10 CARDozo L. REV. 3 (1988):
From [Cardozo] we learned that judging could not properly be characterized
as simply the application of pure reason to legal problems, nor, at the other
extreme, as the application of the personal will or passion of the judge.
Cardozo drew our attention to a complex interplay of forces-rational and
emotional, conscious and unconscious-by which no judge could remain
unaffected.... [T]his interplay of forces, this internal dialogue of reason and
passion, does not taint the judicial process, but is in fact central to its vitality.
62. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 70.
63. Id.
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provide an answer to his colleagues' question."
He was also motivated by "the strange separation" of who
we are from what we do, the sense that caring about what we
do is either unimportant or taken for granted.6 That strange
separation should likewise motivate us as lawyers. We should,
in both our education and practice, encourage "the responsibili-
ties of the self"; we should insist upon "the reality of both the
individual person and the community at large."' Who we are,
what we do, are inseparable. As lawyers, we have the opportu-
nity to exercise our individual talents and initiative on behalf
of someone or something in need. We can make a difference in
our world. But, perhaps, like Pirsig, we must begin by sorting
out our world.
To sort his world, Pirsig used the image of a knife which
he wanted to place on quality:
What every intellectual analyst looks for. You take your
analytic knife, put the point directly on the term Quality and
just tap, not hard, gently, and the whole world splits,
cleaves, right in two-hip and square, classic and romantic,
technological and humanistic--and the split is clean. 7
Quality was to be a cleavage point and a point of common
understanding."
We lawyers should likewise search for the point of com-
mon understanding between the doctrinal and the doing,
between the education and the experience. Why is there this
cleavage; where is the point of common understanding? Law
school is an inviting target; we do not have to swing a bass fid-
dle at its backside to insure a hit. It forges an incisive but
64. Id.
65. Id. at 25.
66. White, Doctrine in a Vacuum, supra note 12, at 261-62. This responsibility of
self and the potential for accountable action is for me the challenge and the joy of a
life with the law. See James B. White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415, 436 (1982):
It is the aim of our law not to obliterate individual judicial judgments in favor
of a scheme, but to structure and discipline them, to render them public and
accountable. This is true of the lawyer as well as the judge, and the client
knows it; he pays not for skill in determining mechanical consequences, but
for highly complex individual judgments.... The reconstitution of our legal
culture and its language must always be done, if it is to be done at all, by
individual minds, and that means with individual differences. These
differences, when properly publicized and disciplined, are not to be lamented
but celebrated.
67. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 196.
68. Id. at 200.
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unidimensional thinking style-the focused, not the open-
ended inquiry.6 9 It drives out the emotional, the personal. It
views the profession "through the mist of legal rules and legal
problems."7 ° It wants clarity, not vagueness; specifics, not gen-
eralities; structure, not flexibility; toughness, not sensitivity.
Law school training has been criticized for its failings, its
lack of relevance to practice.7 ' The result has been likened to
a vast intellectual wasteland: arid, barren, not worth the cross-
ing.72 It produces a person capable of detached analysis, but
the side effects of that production on the person have been
described in terms that would make a frontal lobotomy a posi-
tive alternative.73
We lawyers must be concerned with our Classic and our
Romantic selves. An unleavened classical training can so
imbue lawyers with the law's purely rational aspects that they
forget that the practice of law is foremost a human enter-
prise.74 We must be concerned that "neglect of self and abro-
gation of one's personal values is an outgrowth of the process
of learning the law; and that learning to 'talk like a lawyer'
and 'think like a lawyer' may encourage some to forget that
[we] are first and foremost human beings."75 We must recog-
nize the rational and emotional, our outer and inner selves.76
There must not be that strange separation of who we are from
what we do.
69. See Redmount, supra note 13, at 872.
70. Elkins, The Legal Persona, supra note 23, at 739-40. Professor Elkins said that
"[i]n essence, a lawyer's way of thinking and representing certain events in the world
consists of a dislike of vague generalities, the structuring of all possible human
relations into the form of claims and counterclaims, and the belief that human
conflicts can be settled under established rules in a judicial proceeding."
71. See Matin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching and
Scholarship, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 394-95 (1990).
72. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32
J. LEGAL EDuc. 591 (1982).
73. Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert S. Redmount, Legal Education: Te Classroom
Experience, 52 NoTRE DAME LAW. 190, 197 (1976).
74. Peter W. Gross, Intellect Beyond Law: The Case of Legal Education, 33 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 391, 395-97 (1985).
75. Harvey M. Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study of
Law, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 87, 97-98 (1982).
76. See James R. Elkins, The Paradox of a Life in Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 129,
159 (1979):
The paradox for the law student/teacher/lawyer is that the legal world is at
the same time a pragmatic world of technical skills and craftlike precision and
a world of theories and ideals of legal justice, fairness, and equality. In such a
paradoxical world, the lawyer-artist is our guide.
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IV. THE TRANSCENDENCE OF QUALITY
The very strangeness of that separation led Pirsig to look
for a different reality. Neither the Classic nor the Romantic
explanation was satisfactory, nor could he find an adequate in-
between." The two had to be joined into one. Pirsig thought
that quality, "a term that can split a world into ... classic and
romantic . . . is an entity that can unite a world already split
along these lines into one.""8 However, the more Pirsig applied
his knife to quality, the more confused the picture became.
Quality, like the sorcerer's apprentice's broom, divided and
subdivided, got completely out of control, and Pirsig, like the
apprentice, forgot the incantation.79
Pirsig ultimately refused to define quality as either objec-
tive or subjective. It was not objective; it did not reside in the
material world. It was not subjective; it did not reside merely
in individual preference. For Pirsig, quality was another
entity, independent of the two, s° but which could be found in
their relationship.8 ' It does not result from a collision between
objective and subjective but "is the cause of the subject and
object which are then mistakenly presumed to be the cause of
77. See Parker, supra note 9, at 321:
The conclusion that [Pirsig] reached was that the problem of whether Quality
was subjective or objective was itself a misconception resulting from the
classic-romantic split. Instead of seeing the world as made up of what is out
there, objective and definable, plus our subjective reactions to it, one needed
to realize that the subjective and the objective were simply aspects of reality.
78. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 200. See also W.T. Lhamon Jr., A Fine Fiction, NEW
REPUBLIC, June 29, 1974 (reviewing ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF
MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE (1974)), at 25-26:
Both [romantic and classical] voices are inadequate: two halves of one larger
vision each arrogating all truth and reality to its own method.... However,
Pirsig and other new writers hope to surmount the battle neither by joining
one side to vanquish the other, nor by staking out a golden mean, but by
imagining, living and yoking the extremes.
79. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 211-12.
80. Id at 213.
81. Id at 215. See Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon
Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225, 2229 (1989),
rejecting
bath the belief that meaning has foundation in objective correspondence with
the world and the contrasting view that meaning can be nothing more than
the arbitrary result either of social convention or of uncontrolled subjectivity.
Instead, I ... describe meaning as located in the process through which the
human organism interacts with its world and employs its existence
imaginatively to elaborate meaning through the use of experientially
grounded image-schemata, models, metaphors, and metonymies.
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the Quality."82
Quality is not subordinate, it is superordinate; it does not
result, it creates. It is not an aspect of reality, it is reality; it is
the source and the substance. It comes, as Roger Cramton so
eloquently said about justice and love, from a source beyond,
call it what you will." There is a transcending force that
relates the interplay of classic and romantic, of justice and
love, ennobling us. By accepting this view of quality, Pirsig
transcended the classic-romantic split, that strange separation
between thinking and feeling.8 He did not abandon reason.
He expanded its nature "to include elements that had previ-
ously been unassimilable and thus have been considered
irrational. 8 5
For Pirsig, quality became a source." Quality was "not
capricious, it is the force that opposes capriciousness; the order-
ing principle of all ... thought which destroys capriciousness
and without which no ... thought can proceed..... Pirsig saw
that in every problem-solving situation, mechanical or legal,
there's a beautiful way of doing it and an ugly way of doing
it, and in arriving at the high-quality, beautiful way of doing
it, both an ability to see what "looks good" and an ability to
understand the underlying methods to arrive at that "good"
are needed. Both Classic and Romantic understanding of
Quality must be combined.88
82. Pirsig, supra note 1, at 215.
83. See Roger C. Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509,
518 (1987):
In an ultimate sense, both love and justice come from a source beyond us-a
transforming, ennobling source that some call God. Love and justice are gifts
that come to us by grace; they are not things given by government or
institutional arrangements.... Law, the efforts of lawyers, and the character
of our social and legal arrangements can further them or frustrate them. In
this view, love and justice are related: justice must always be informed by
love if it is to be just; and love must always meet the demands of justice if it is
to be loving.
See also Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2280, 2317 (1989): "Polyphony realized in politics-fully, authentically, externally
as well as internally-bears witness not to the human imagination's aesthetic self-
transformation through narrative but to the redemptive power of a beyond in the
midst of our life."
84. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 149.
85. Id. at 230.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 242.
88. Id. at 262. See Christopher D. Stone, Introduction: Interpreting the
Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985), rejecting the "mindless vogue" that all
interpretations, all analyses are as good as any other and asking a Pirsig-like question
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The solution is not subordinating Classic to Romantic or
Romantic to Classic; they should be united. 9
Lawyers must also unite their classic and romantic selves.
For too long, we paid sole heed to the myth of rationality,
refusing to see that being a lawyer unavoidably implicates our
intuition, our feelings, both as individuals and as members of a
professional community; we lost sight "of the dynamic reci-
procity between the conscious and the unconscious modes of
thought."'  Perhaps in our need to legitimize law as an intel-
lectual discipline, we forgot that the law is also an activity, a
doing, "more like painting than archaeology... more a process
of creation than pure discovery."'"
For Pirsig, quality is neither objective nor subjective; it is
neither form nor technique. Quality informs both and is
reflected in the proper conjunction of both. Quality is mysteri-
ous and individual.2 The individual is a participant in its crea-
tion; quality emerges as a relationship between the individual
and his or her experience.93 Pirsig had come close to being
gored by the horns of his colleagues' question. His escape was
to leap between the horns, to vault over and beyond. The
answer to his colleagues' question was not objective or subjec-
tive, Classic or Romantic. He broke out of those narrow alleys;
he saw a new way.
We lawyers have trouble breaking out of our alleys.' We
do not think about or promote thinking about what quality is
in our professional culture. We do not see or encourage a view
beyond the immediate.95 We do not understand or make
of the reader: "Perhaps this should be our common quarry: What makes one of
several acceptable interpretations the best?"
89. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 264.
90. Elkins, The Legal Persona, supra note 23, at 739 n. 20.
91. Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA.
L. REv. 937, 983 (1990). See also Eric Mills Holmes, Education for Competent
Lawuyering-Case Method in a Functional Context, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 535, 560 (1976).
92. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 305.
93. Id. at 338. See Winter, supra note 40, at 1112-13:
[N]either objectivism . . . nor subjectivism or relativism ... captures the
complex reality of law as the product of a human rationality that, although
grounded in human experience, is largely imaginative and metaphoric....
The process is, rather, situated in the experiences of actual human beings and
is shaped by the ways they understand their experience.
94. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st-Century
Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612 (1984).
95. See Payton, supra note 8, at 246:
When we speak of a purposive decision maker as having "judgment" we really
mean to say that he or she has an ability to see the likely consequences of
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known that the law is a process, is constantly being remade,
and we as lawyers are present at that creation.
96
We are not a class of intellectual robots. We are not doc-
trinal drones; we put that doctrine to work on the specific
problems of real people. 7 And, like Pirsig's mechanic, when
we work on problems, we also work on ourselves."
We must consider what motivates us as lawyers. We must
demand the ethical as well as the merely efficient.99 We must
consider whether we are doing quality work, making quality
decisions, "building on a foundation of Quality within the indi-
viduals involved," returning, as Pirsig's work urges us, to "indi-
vidual integrity, self-reliance and old-fashioned gumption."'"
The quest for quality is not soft-headed; it demands more
than just good enough. Zen teaches that when "there is a
choice, choose. Pick the best there is."''1 1 Whenever we do
present actions; this kind of judgment translates into an ability to design and
implement successful courses of action. When we speak of a lawyer as having
"judgment" we mean much the same thing.
96. See White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 10, at 691. See also Irvin C. Rutter, A
Jurisprudence of Lawyers' Operations, 13 J. LEGAL EDUc. 301, 303 (1961).
97. See Kreiling, supra note 17, at 288:
[Clinical education should teach students a method: how to develop theories
of problem-solving by utilizing established lawyering theory and by
generalizing from experience; how to apply these theories in the actual
performance of lawyering tasks; [and] how to analyze the result of
performance in order to test the effectiveness of the action taken and thereby
improve one's theory.
98. See White, Doctrine in a Vacuum, supra note 12, at 259:
The most valuable attainment that a student will carry with her from our law
school into the great world is not intellectual baggage in the form of boxes
and trunks full of rules, distinctions, argument, and so on but a more fully
educated mind. And her mind is also the organ by which she will claim to
find or make meaning in her life-including moral meaning-the organ by
which she will organize her own experience into a coherent and tolerable
whole.
99. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search For Truth." An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1031, 1051 (1975). See also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend. The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1077 (1976):
The lawyer-client relation is a personal relation, and legal counsel is a
personal service. This explains directly why, once the relation has been
contracted, considerations of efficiency or fair distribution cannot be allowed
to weaken it. The relation itself is not a creature of social expediency... it is
the creature of moral right, and therefore expediency may not compromise
the nature of the relation.
100. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 322. See also Keeton, supra note 18, at 211; Shaffer,
supra note 39, at 249.
101. VAN DE WETERING, A GLIMPSE OF NOTHINGNESS, supra note 2, at 30. See also
Donal Henahan, At Carnegie: The Best vs. Just O.K, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1988, at H1,
27:
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something we should look for quality options and pursue them;
that raises what we do out of the mundane and gives it
value. 102 Quality changes the job, the worker, the atmosphere
"because the Quality tends to fan out like waves."103
This is certainly true of the law. A good legal education
will teach people how to recognize and pursue quality
options.1 4 It is rigorous, demanding an acceptance of nothing
less than the best from the individual. It does not show the
individual "a particular set of questions and dialectical
responses, to be repeated on other occasions, but ... how to
ask questions of one's own."'10 5 Able lawyers are creative, and
they create for a client a solution for a specific situation."°
Able lawyers also know how to "separate what merely looks
good from what lasts."'10
7
But lawyers must keep the right attitude. We must
remain interested in the mystery of what we do. Pirsig found
mysteries in the most mundane of tasks, even in tuning his
motorcycle. It was a ritual he had been through a hundred
times, but he remained alert, looking for the new, the novel.l08
What Pirsig had, what able lawyers have, is an openness to
"the kind of truth you see laterally, out of the corner of your
It is not hard to acquire a taste for less than the best. A soft-headed
acceptance of the perfectly O.K. and the routinely blameless usually comes
first. From there it is a slippery slope: a grudging tolerance for mediocrity
and, when the bottom is reached, an unembarrassed affection for whatever
is. . . . Critics are notably susceptible to this progressive illness of the
spirit .... The temptation is to stay friendly with everyone and acquire a taste
for less than the best. But then, what is left to be said when something better
turns up? ... Good enough, let alone bad enough, will not do.
102. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 323.
103. Id.
104. Parker, supra note 9, at 326.
105. James B. White, The Ethics of Argument" Plato's Gorgias and the Modern
Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 869 (1983).
106. See White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 10, at 695:
Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of something rather
than out of nothing. It always starts in a particular culture and among other
particular people. There is always one speaker addressing others in a
particular situation, about concerns that are real and important to somebody,
and speaking a particular language.
107. Robert Pirsig, Cruising Blues and Their Cure, ESQUIRE, May 1977, at 68.
108. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 84. While all of us live by routine, "the moments of
change are of importance. At those moments we are forced to wake up and look
around. And only when we are awake do we see something, and there is much to be
seen. We live in a miraculous world." VAN DE WETERING, THF EMPTY MIRROR, supra
note 2, at 62.
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eye."'" It is more than repetition of what has gone before; it is
about what can be."'
Pirsig's quest led him to that strange separation of what
we are from what we do. That separation results from a lack
of caring, a lack of appreciation for quality. Care and quality
are not divisible."' A person working toward quality is one
who cares. A person caring about what is done can produce
quality results.
112
Able lawyers care; they know that their practice, their
activity, affects more than just the legal community. It affects
the community at large."' Able legal educators care; they
know their students will join that community. 1 4  They care
about expanding vision as well as increasing intelligence,'1 5
care about educating in a way that develops "a broad sequence
of related and dependent qualities,""' 6 care about providing
students "a method for future learning from their
experiences."" 7
Law has quality, has value, and lawyers have a construc-
tive role to play." 8  Lawyers help clients develop a better
109. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 106.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 247.
112. See Parker, supra note 9, at 325:
What enables the craftsman to make adjustments in the way he describes the
world is his involvment in his work.... This involvement, which makes the
problems which seem to impede progress just as interesting and rewarding as
the work proceeding without "problems," is a necessary condition for quality
results. One must "care."
113. See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend, supra note 99, at 1068-69:
Before there is morality, there must be the person. We must attain and
maintain in our morality a concept of personality such that it makes sense to
posit choosing, valuing entities-free, moral beings. . . . [O]ne wishes to
develop a conception of a responsible, valuable, and valuing agent, and such
an agent must first of all be dear to himself. It is from the kernel of
individuality that the other things we value radiate.... [A]ny concern for
others which is a human concern must presuppose a concern for ourselves.
The human concern which we then show others is a concern which first of all
recognizes the concrete individuality of that other person just as we recognize
our own.
See also White, The Study of Law, supra note 24, at 3.
114. Parker, supra note 9, at 327.
115. See Payton, supra note 8, at 237.
116. Holmes, supra note 91, at 562.
117. Kreiling, supra note 17, at 284.
118. See Charles Fried, The Articial Reason of the Law, or: What Lawyers
Know, 60 TEx. L. REv. 35, 57 (1981):
It is the peculiar task of law to complete [the] structure of ideals and values,
to bring it down to earth; to complete it so that it is seated firmly and
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informed basis for choices that have value implications; we use
our knowledge and skills to insure that our clients make
informed choices." 9 We help to make and remake the law con-
stantly; our creation and recreation must be done with a con-
cern for quality. As lawyers, we know that the decisions we
make, the actions we take, say much about how we, as a soci-
ety, are to live.120
V. PUTTING THE GARDEN BACK INTO THE LEGAL MACHINE l 21
Pirsig provided guides for making quality decisions
(although the more classic reader may find the guides too
vague). The first is inner quietness. "The way to see what
looks good and understand the reason it looks good, and to be
at one with this goodness as the work proceeds, is to cultivate
an inner quietness, a peace of mind so the goodness can shine
through.'
'122
Pirsig saw a reflection of inner quietness in the work of
skilled mechanics; we should also see it in the work of able
lawyers who, like skilled mechanics, not only spot problems
but do something about them. 23 They are involved in their
work; they do not separate self and surrounding. They are
patient, careful, attentive. Their serenity will produce right
values that will produce right thoughts that will produce right
concretely and shelters real human beings against the storms of passion and
onflict .... [I]f the legal foundation is to support the whole, then ideals and
values must constrain, limit, inform, and inspire the foundation-but no more.
The law really is an independent, distinct part of the structure of value.
119. Keeton, supra note 18, at 211.
120. Patterson, supra note 91, at 995. See also White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note
10, at 696.
121. See Lhamon, supra note 78, at 25: "Pirsig is one of many writers now worried
about slipping the garden back into the machine-art back into artifice, romantic back
into classical .. "
122. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 265. See also VAN DE WETERING, THE EMPTY MiRRo,
supra note 3, at 24: "To be able to concentrate well your spirit has to be in balance;
when your spirit is in balance your body has to be in balance as well."
123. See PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 266:
To say that they are not artists is to misunderstand the nature of art. They
have patience, care and attentiveness to what they're doing, but more than
this-there's a kind of inner peace of mind that isn't contrived but results
from a kind of harmony with the work in which there's no leader and no
follower. The material and the craftsman's thoughts change together in a
progression of smooth, even changes until his mind is at rest at the exact
instant that the material is right.
See also James R. Elkins, Professing Law: Does Teaching Matter?, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
35, 46 (1986).
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actions that will produce quality work.' 24
The second guide is caring, trying to do everything as well
as possible. 12  You identify with what you are doing. You are
aware, concentrated. There is no separation between who you
are and what you do; you work for the best, for quality itself.
126
Good mechanics and able lawyers want to do as well as they
can.'2 Good mechanics and able lawyers have a feeling for
and care about that personally satisfying and outwardly pleas-
ing fusion of intellect and action in their work.'~
The final guide is that there is no one true path to quality.
Quality is achieved in as many ways as there are people striv-
ing for it. Pirsig saw that the "selection from among many
choices, the art of the work is just as dependent upon your
own mind and spirit as it is upon the material of the
machine."'129 Again, he looked to the craftsman
who isn't ever following a single line of instruction. He's
making decisions as he goes along. For that reason he'll be
absorbed and attentive to what he's doing even though he
doesn't deliberately contrive this. His motions and the
machine are in a kind of harmony. He isn't following any
set of written instructions because the nature of the material
at hand determines his thoughts and motions, which simul-
taneously change the nature of the material at hand.
130
124. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 267.
125. Id. at 253-67.
126. Id. at 267. See also VAN DE WETERING, THE EMPTY MIRROR, supra note 3, at
35.
127. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 253. See also VAN DE WETERING, THE EMPTY MIRROR,
supra note 3, at 61, where the author is being instructed by the head monk:
The monastic training tries to wake us up, but when it is time to sleep you
may sleep. But when you are not asleep, be awake. When you are cleaning
vegetables, you really have to clean them. The idea is to throw the good
pieces into the pot and the rotten pieces into the tin, not the other way
around. Whatever you do, do it well, as well as you can, and be aware of what
you are doing.
128. See Robin West, JurLprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of
Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 145, 210-11 (1985):
To the extent that legal theory is narrative, however, it is also art. Therefore
we must decide not whether the worlds we envision are true or false, right or
wrong. Rather, we must decide whether they are attractive or repulsive,
beautiful or ugly.... The aesthetic quality of our art ... deeply affects our
lives: our imaginings are not only a part of our present, but a way of
determining the limits of our future.... [W]e have a pronounced habit of
quickly becoming the legal actors we like to imagine.
129. PIRSIG, supra note 1, at 147-48.
130. Id. at 148. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as Myth." Reflections on Plato's
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This is more art than mechanics. This is the exciting rela-
tionship of intellect and action. It is dealing with the surpris-
ing, the spontaneous, the unexpected. This is not mimicry; it is
creativity.
The same applies in the law. The able lawyer is an artist,
capable of improvisation. The able lawyer is not formulaic but
responds to every new situation. The able lawyer is well-
grounded in tradition but open to the opportunities in each
new problem.13' The practice of law is an art; it commits us to
"a life time of continuous adaptation and learning"; to produce
quality, we must work with a disciplined imagination.'32 The
law is malleable and capricious. It constantly requires us to
learn and adapt, to be critically self-reflective. This enables us
to judge our own performance, to identify where we need to
develop, and to evaluate the effect of what we have done and
what we propose to do.' 33 Again, this is not mimicry; it is crea-
tivity. By caring, we can bring true quality to this creativity.
In frightful words, one commentator said it is possible to
reduce law to
two features: policy choices and techniques for their imple-
mentation. Our questions are "What do we want?" and
"How do we get it?" In this way, the conception of the law
as a set of rules merges with the conception of law as a set of
institutions and processes. The overriding metaphor is that
of the machine; the overriding value is that of efficiency,
conceived of as the attainment of certain ends with the
smallest possible costs."3
That is not how I see my profession. We must be more
concerned with the quality of what we do. 3' We are not
Gorgias, 74 IowA L. REV. 787, 794-95 (1989). See also Whitney Balliett, Bob's Your
Uncle, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 23, 1987, at 126, quoting jazz pianist George Shearing:
When you improvise, in addition to your tone production you must have a
musical atmosphere in your head-a musical climate .... The gift of
improvisation is being able to weave from one chord to another. It's a
question of immediately getting what's in your mind into your fingers. If you
could explain it, which I can't, all the surprise and spontaneity and
unexpectedness would disappear.
131. Patterson, supra note 91, at 988.
132. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Competing Aims of Legal Education, 59 N.D. L. REV.
533, 544 (1983).
133. See Feldman & Feinman, supra note 57, at 929.
134. White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 10, at 686. This is not what Professor
White wants. See White, Doctrine in a Vacuum, supra note 12, at 253-54.
135. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 MD. L. REV.
274, 288-93 (1986) and Holmes, supra note 91, at 542.
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amoral rational robots; we deal with the law's operations and
effects in society, and with the nature and meaning of the per-
sonal and social behavior with which the law deals. 3 6  The
problems with which the law
deals, the ways in which it deals with them, and ... the
issues with which it fails to deal are expressions of the ideas,
values and tensions that may be found within society. [O]ne
studies it for the same reason that one studies anything else,
to acquire knowledge of the world. That knowledge is both
an end in itself and a condition for intelligent, purposeful,
and therefore moral action.
137
I learned in practice, and I now try to teach, that the law is a
way of learning about things, including ourselves."s
Legal education and, by implication, legal practice, has
been characterized as serving neither the person's, nor the pro-
fession's, nor society's best interests. 3 9  That critique, made
shortly after Pirsig's book was published, continues to echo.14
136. See James B. White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto," 39 MERCER L.
REV. 739, 748-49 (1988):
The central question for us as lawyers is how legal power ought to be
exercised: upon what conception of oneself, of the litigants, of one's audience,
of the prior texts that bear upon the case, of the culture of argument that is
the law. Real-world answers to such questions cannot be merely theoretical
in character, but must be performative, actual enactments in the texts ....
137. Sandalow, supra note 59, at 172-73. See also Cramton, supra note 83, at 511:
I believe that a sense of calling is essential for law teachers and students. The
search for truth, with all that implies concerning the meaningfulness of
objective reality and the importance of the procedures by which we attempt to
describe and talk about it, is a central commitment of the legal scholar. Is
there not also a commitment, both for the law teacher and student, to search
for the good? A renewed understanding of what it means to be a professional
should include a commitment to something other than acquisition and success.
If so, law schools have an educational responsibility to deal with the larger
normative issues that infuse the application and use of legal technique.
138. See Elkins, The Quest, supra note 3, at 597:
Teachers of law need ways of thinking and talking about legal education that
will help us and help our students to confront, critique, and "see through" the
prosaic, technical legalism of law school. We need a language that makes
rather than denies meaning. To engage in the everyday reality of becoming a
lawyer without reflecting on where it is taking us and what kind of journey it
may turn out to be, or on how we are remaking ourselves to serve purposes
we abhor, means that we give up our own souls.
139. Robert S. Redmount & Thomas L. Shaffer, Learning the Law-Thoughts
Toward a Human Perspective, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 956, 969 (1976). The authors
wanted "to stimulate an interest in significant change in legal education, a change in
the direction of greater humanism and greater contact with interpersonal and social
reality." Id.
140. See Sandalow, supra note 59, at 167-68:
The notion that a legal education is merely instrumental . . . rests upon a
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Legal education and practice should enhance our capacity
"to think clearly, to feel intelligently and to act knowingly.""'
No law student, no lawyer, should be so concerned with exer-
cising intellectual power that he or she becomes numb to the
results of that exercise; no law student, no lawyer, should
learn or practice in a one-sided, restricted, indifferent man-
ner.1"2 A lawyer's education and practice must reflect more
than that; it should be attended by "[j]udgments of value that
recognize the legitimacy of moral concerns, provide the means
for moral analysis, and accept the validity and even the pri-
macy of moral experience and judgments....""
Able lawyers are explicators and creators; they know that
the important knowledge is not only scientific, rational, theo-
retical but also "practical, experiential-the sense that one
knows how to do things with language and with others."'"
confusion of thought. It does not follow from the fact that our students will
shortly undertake professional obligations of service that we are entitled to
treat them as instruments. Their status as persons, as sources of value rather
than merely a means by which value is attained, is diminished if we abstract
from them the roles that they later will play in relation to others, seeking
only to equip them for those roles. Appropriate respect for them as persons
requires that we take as the main object of legal education the enhancement
of their capacity to realize their human potential as it is understood in our
culture.
141. Id. at 173-74. Sandalow continued:
The intellectual and moral qualities I have been considering are the proper
ends of education because they are the qualities that men and women require
to realize their human potential and to act as moral beings... .. Courage,
patience, sensibility, knowledge, breadth of perspective, clarity of thought...
are essential if lawyers are adequately to serve their clients and meet the
obligations of public service they are so frequently called upon to undertake.
See also Robert L. Stenger, Should a Professor of Law Profess Law?, 31 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 81, 97 (1986).
142. See Erwin N. Griswold, Law Schools and Human Relations, 1955 WASH. U.
L.Q. 217 (1955). See also Jack Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry
into the Application of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53
N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 537 (1978), where, in advocating the use of humanistic insights in
the law school classroom, the author said such
an approach is particularly critical if the profession is to address the
dehumanization that occurs all too frequently in lawyering and if the lawyer
is to appreciate his client and others as whole persons rather than just legal
problems.... It is, however, particularly hard for the lawyer who is trained to
evaluate information, situations, and individuals in terms of their legal
relevance rather than their humanity. The professional role he learns and the
way in which he learns it fosters the lawyer's "respond[ing] to the client as an
object."
143. Redmount, supra note 13, at 865. See also Kenney Hegland, Moral Dilemmas
in Teaching Trial Advocacy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 69 (1982).
144. White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 10, at 695. See Brennan, supra note 61, at
1992] Art of Becoming (And Being) A Lawyer
They establish a position in the legal culture from which they
think clearly, feel intelligently, act knowingly.
145
If Pirsig's colleagues had been lawyers, their tough ques-
tion might have been whether an able lawyer can be a good
person, can practice in a way that deserves respect, individual
and communal.'" The answer must be yes. The "integrated
and autonomous person maintains the capacity, disposition,
and sensitivity to respond appropriately when acting in or out
of a professional role.'1 47 Striving for quality is a goal we all
can share as lawyers.14' We lawyers-the lawyer/student, the
lawyer/teacher, the lawyer/practitioner-must work as Pirsig
did, to achieve insight and understanding about ourselves and
about our relations with others.149 The quest for quality allows
"The law has its piercing intuitions," (Cardozo] wrote, "its tense, apocalyptic
moments." "Imagination, whether you call it scientific or artistic, is for [both
law and science] the faculty that creates." The well-springs of imagination, of
course, lie less in logic than in the realm of human experience- the realm in
which law ultimately operates and has meaning. Sensitivity to one's intuitive
and passionate responses, and awareness of the range of human experience, is
therefore not only an inevitable but a desirable part of the judicial process, an
aspect more to be nurtured than feared.
Id. (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928)).
145. White, The Study of Law, supra note 24, at 4-5. See also White, Law as
Language, supra note 66, at 444:
To conceive of the law as a rhetorical and social system, a way in which we
use an inherited language to talk to each other and to maintain a community,
suggests in a new way that the heart of law is what we always knew it was:
the open hearing in which one point of view, one construction of language and
reality, is tested against another. The multiplicity of readings that the law
permits is not its weakness, but its strength, for it is this that makes room for
different voices, and gives a purchase by which culture may be modified in
response to the demands of circumstance. It is a method at once for the
recognition of others, for the acknowledgment of ignorance, and for cultural
change.
146. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend, supra note 99, at 1060-61.
147. Steven D. Pepe, Clinical Education: Is Taking Rites Seriously a Fantasy,
Folly or Failure?, 18 U. MiCH. J.L. REF. 307, 312 (1985).
148. See Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation
Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1659 (1985).
149. Elkins, The Legal Persona, supra note 23, at 755. See also Kari Johnson &
Ann Scales, An Absolutely, Positively True Story: Seven Reasons Why We Sing, 16
N.M. L. REV. 433, 436 n.4 (1986):
We can never get beyond where the Realists left off unless we act as if that
distinction [between theory and practice] doesn't exist. Because we not only
create, but are also created by, the institutions in which we work and live,
impasses in thought can be surmounted only by changes in reality. New
avenues for theory will remain invisible without transformation of
experience.
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for no separation of personal and professional self."s
By our training and our licensing, we are given great free-
dom and responsibility. We are independent professionals
whose work has substantial social impact. We discover and
create within ourselves and in our profession and our society.
The quest for quality reminds us that we are responsible for
our conduct; our lives as lawyers constantly call up questions
of personal as well as professional life.' 5 '
Can we define quality in law? Probably not to everyone's
satisfaction. 5 ' But we do know what quality in law is. It
comes from within; it is not satisfied by the purely rational and
analytical. It is individual, internal, intuitive. It is the goal of
caring lawyers, a reflection of value and purpose in our
profession. 53
150. See Shaffer, supra note 39, at 244; White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 10, at
691; and Gross, supra note 74, at 398.
151. White, The Ethics of Argument, supra note 105, at 895.
152. In Justice, Expediency, and Beauty, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 141 (1987), Louis B.
Schwartz defined justice as
a complex quality of fitness, proportionateness to the situation, responsiveness
to tradition as well as to the need for change, and sensitivity to both
individual hardship and the general good. Admittedly, justice so defined is
not precisely measurable. But many of the most important aspects of our
collective and individual lives, such as love, health, and patriotism, are not
quantifiable. They are not, however, on that account, less significant.
Id at 142. Professor Schwartz faced the same problem in assigning an aesthetic crite-
rion, beauty, to justice, acknowledging that it
is an example of a concept.., that is essential and useful although difficult to
appraise and impossible to quantify.... That [beauty] concept expresses an
abiding aspiration for a quality that transcends utility or expediency. It is a
quality that evokes in the appropriate audience a recognition of rightness, of
fittingness according to a complex of psychological, historical, and political
background shared by that audience.
Id. at 145-46. See also Chang, supra note 2, at 564:
Zen experiential reality . . . offers the possibility of grasping the whole in a
single stroke-yet it denies the ability to describe that experience. This inca-
pability of expression makes the experience seem of limited value. Paradigms
that do not offer a normal process of problem solving seem to be merely aes-
thetic experiences and inappropriate in an arena as pragmatically self-con-
scious as law. Yet, the experiential leap accompanied by "seeing" [a court
decision] directly can have profoundly empowering consequences.
153. See Chang, supra note 2, at 572:
[O]ne must not think that this article is urging a kind of individual anarchy
created by having each individual choose her own kind of reality.... The
paradigm shift accomplished by overcoming the world of the conceptual does
not lead to anarchy and nihilism. Rather, the experience of satori in Zen
would lead one to conclude that a postshift person would see law in its
conceptual nature clearly. In such a state there is a potential for self-
actualization and the opportunity to experience power over one's experience
in life. Law, then, would not be the force that dictates results. Rather, law
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There should not be that strange separation of what we
are from what we do. What we are and what we do should
always be guided by quality, by the relationship between our-
selves and our experience." Think clearly, feel intelligently,
act knowingly.
would simply be the frame or context, like an empty baseball field, in which
one's chosen experiences were about to take place.
154. See Cramton, supra note 83, at 515:
Being fully human is being rational as well as intuitive and insightful.
Openness to new experiences and insights, constant reformulation of beliefs
based on new knowledge, a tolerance for other views that are supported by
data or rational argument-these are the basic elements of the method by
which we can arrive at closer approximations of the truth.
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